This paper concerns the rational reconstruction of physical theories initially advanced by F. P. Ramsey and later elaborated by Rudolf Carnap. The Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction of theoretical knowledge is a natural development of classical empiricist ideas, one that is informed by Russell's philosophical logic and his theories of propositional understanding and knowledge of matter; as such, it is not merely a schematic representation of the notion of an empirical theory, but the backbone of a general account of our knowledge of the physical world. Carnap-Ramsey is an illuminating approach to epistemological problems that remain with us, one whose difficulties are shared by accounts that have sought to replace it.
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Introduction
My focus in this paper is the rational reconstruction of physical theories initially advanced by F. P. Ramsey, and later elaborated by Rudolf Carnap. As will become clear in what follows, the Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction of theoretical knowledge is a natural development of classical empiricist ideas, one that is informed by Russell's philosophical logic and his theories of propositional understanding and knowledge of matter; as such, it is not merely a schematic representation of the notion of an empirical theory, but the backbone of a general account of our knowledge of the physical world. Nor is it merely an interesting episode in the history of the philosophy Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 54 (2003) , 371-403, axg301 of science; Carnap-Ramsey is an illuminating, if not ultimately satisfying, approach to epistemological problems that remain with us.
To give a preliminary overview, the classical epistemological issue to which Russell sought to apply his logical discoveries was that of showing how, on the basis of minimal assumptions regarding the scope of our experience, one might articulate an account of our knowledge of the material world. A first step toward a solution would have to address the fact that we succeed in understanding propositions which transcend the limitations of our experience. It is how Russell addressed this first step that is of primary interest for what follows. In the reconstructive program of Carnap and Ramsey, Russell's problem is transformed into an issue in the theory of theories: on the basis of a particular choice of a minimal non-logical vocabulary, to recover our theoretical knowledge within an expressively equivalent framework, a framework that preserves the characteristic features of our pre-analytic applications of the concepts of logical consequence, reference and truth. It is a condition of adequacy accepted by both programs that they should recover many pre-analytic intuitions about our theoretical knowledge. Thus, although both the classical and reconstructive programs have foundationalist overtones, it would be a mistake to view them as motivated by skeptical doubts concerning our theoretical beliefs.
In light of the extreme generality of the Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction, it might seem tendentious to characterize it as a reconstruction of physics. Indeed, the highly schematic and abstract style that the approach exemplifies has given way to more specialized foundational investigations of particular classes of physical theories. Unfortunately, this shift was accomplished without sufficient appreciation of what the reconstructive program we will be examining sought to accomplish. The aims of the Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction mandated that it should be stated with great generality; even though the reconstruction does not depend on the characteristics of any special class of physical theories, its applicability to physics is essential to its epistemological point. I believe-and will try to show-that insuperable difficulties confront the Carnap-Ramsey reconstructive program. But I hope also to make it clear that Carnap's and Ramsey's reconstructions possess not only internal coherence and elegance, but more importantly, a degree of philosophical motivation not matched by rival accounts. Let me begin with a review of the relevant Russellian background to the program I will be exploring.
Russell's theory of propositional understanding
Russell's first reasonably well-articulated application of his theory of descriptions to a traditional epistemological problem-namely that of determining the nature and scope of our knowledge of matter-occurs in The Problems of Philosophy where the theory is extended by the addition of the description theory of names and deployed in support of an exceptionally simple theory of propositional understanding or theory of meaning. Putting to one side the issue of vacuous names, Russell's theory of meaning tells us that if a sentence S(n) contains a name n for an individual with whom we are not acquainted, the proposition expressed by the sentence cannot contain the bearer of the name among its constituents. We must instead imagine that the name is short-hand for a description. This description is in turn analyzed-'contextually defined' after the fashion of the theory of descriptions-into expressions for individuals and propositional functions which are proper constituents of the proposition expressed. The individuals and propositional functions are so chosen that the resulting proposition satisfies what in Problems Russell called 'the fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted' (Russell [1912] , p. 58).
Notice that the point of the theory of Problems is not to eliminate what a non-vacuous name stands for, but to explain, compatibly with the fundamental principle, how a sentence containing the name is understood. 1 For example, I understand the sentence 'Bismarck was an astute diplomat' because I am acquainted with a propositional function that only Bismarck satisfies. A useful way of putting the matter is to say that although the proposition which I assert with this sentence contains Bismarck as a
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1 The exposition of this point is made difficult by the fact that Russell is not always consistent in his use of 'contextual definition'. In fact, Russell can be quite unclear on the distinction between the contextual analysis of an incomplete symbol and the explicit definition of an entity or 'complete symbol'-occasionally even equating the two notions. Cf., e.g., the following passage from Logical atomism: 'One very important heuristic maxim which Dr. Whitehead and I found, by experience, to be applicable in mathematical logic, and have since applied in various other fields, is a form of Ockham's razor. [. . .] The principle may be stated in the form: ''Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities.'' [. . .] A very important example of the principle is Frege's definition of the cardinal number of a given set of terms as the class of all sets that are ''similar'' to the given set. [. . .] Thus a cardinal number is the class of all those classes which are similar to a given class. This definition leaves unchanged the truth-values of all propositions in which cardinal numbers occur, and avoids the inference to a set of entities called ''cardinal numbers,'' which were never needed except for the purpose of making arithmetic intelligible, and are now no longer needed for that purpose. [. . .] Another important example concerns what I call ''definite descriptions,'' i.e., such phrases as ''the even prime,'' ''the present King of England,'' ''the present King of France.'' There has always been a difficulty in interpreting such propositions as ''the present King of France does not exist.'' The difficulty arose through supposing that ''the present King of France'' is the subject of this proposition. [. . .] The fact is that, when the words ''the so-and-so'' occur in a proposition, there is no corresponding single constituent of the proposition, and when the proposition is fully analyzed the words ''the so-and-so'' have disappeared' (Russell [1924] , pp. 326-8). Russell has here overlooked the fact that there must be some independent motivation for treating something as an incomplete symbol-something more than the mere applicability of the method of contextual definition.
constituent, and I succeed in saying something about him, he is not a constituent of the proposition which I express. 2 By hypothesis, the bearer of the name 'Bismarck' exists and is the unique individual satisfying some (possibly complex) propositional function-expression. However, not being known by acquaintance, Bismarck is not himself a constituent of the proposition expressed. He is nevertheless someone to whom we are able to refer and make assertions about because of our acquaintance with a property only he has. If, for example, Bismarck is identified as the first Chancellor of the German Empire, then I succeed in making assertions about Bismarck because, among other things, I am acquainted with the relation expressed by 'x is Chancellor of y.' Russell's argument against Berkelian idealism-clearly one of the central lessons of Problems-is based on the observation we have just reviewed regarding his description theory of names. On Russell's reconstruction, Berkeley fallaciously assumed that the fundamental principle restricts what we can have knowledge about, what propositions we can assert; but in fact, it restricts only the propositions we can express. The application of Russell's new theories of propositions and denoting to our knowledge of the material world proceeds from three explicit assumptions and one tacit assumption. The explicit assumptions are: (i) we are not acquainted with matter; but (ii) it is always possible to formulate a description which is uniquely satisfied by the material object to which we take ourselves to refer; and (iii) these descriptions involve only propositional functions and individuals with which we are acquainted. The tacit assumption is that (iv) the propositional functions with which we are acquainted can be so chosen that their logically primitive constituents apply only to terms with which we are acquainted. Without the tacit assumption (iv), the critique of Berkeley and the epistemological significance of Russell's theory would be severely limited, since it could be objected that the view only secures realism about one part of the material world relative to realism about another.
Precisely how the tacit assumption is to be satisfied is something Problems only hints at, for example, when Russell writes: if a regiment of men are marching along a road, the shape of the regiment will look different from different points of view, but the men will appear arranged in the same order from all points of view. Hence we regard the order as true also in physical space, whereas the shape is only supposed to correspond to the physical space so far as is required for the preservation of the order. (Russell [1912], pp. 32-3) Russell's full elaboration of this idea is given in The Analysis of Matter, where his 'structuralism' is articulated at length.
3 What the response to Berkeley requires is a theory that will allow us to dispense with primitive nonlogical vocabulary items which name or indicate anything with which we are not acquainted-and, in the case of primitive predicates, a theory that admits only primitive non-logical predicates that are true of things with which we are acquainted-while allowing that we can have knowledge about things which fall outside the realm of our acquaintance. In particular, in its application to our knowledge of matter, we demand a theory that will explain how our ability to formulate propositions which express truths about the material world need not in any way require our acquaintance with that world. It is these desiderata that Russell's structuralism was intended to fulfill. To see at least in outline how structuralism proposed to meet these goals, let us recall what is characteristic of the general characterization of structure in terms of structural similarity and its elaboration in the 'relation arithmetic' of Principia Mathematica. The model on which Russell's definition of a structure was based is the Frege-Russell definition of the cardinal numbers as similarity classes under the relation of one-one correspondence. As Frege perceived in Grundlagen, and as Russell was to discover some years later, the notion of one-one correspondence, being definable in wholly logical terms, is independent of spatio-temporal intuition. It follows that this must also be true of structural similarity, since it rests only on the notion of one-one correspondence and the general concept of a relation. Thus, for Russell, the philosophical interest of structural similarity derives from the fact that, as a notion of pure logic, it owes nothing to experience or Kantian intuition.
From very early on, Russell seems to have seen his account of structure as capable of providing a framework within which it would be possible to articulate the nature of the similarity which philosophers had supposed to exist between appearance and reality or, to use Kantian terminology, between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds-a point whose significance was not lost on Russell; nor, I dare say, was the irony that a concept which owed its genesis to logicism might usefully contribute to the articulation of Kantian doctrine. What had defeated previous attempts was the want of a notion of similarity which was not so great that it would collapse the gulf that was supposed to exist between them, and was not so slight that it could not be reckoned a significant sense of similarity. Russell believed that with the discovery of the notion of structural similarity, he had solved this metaphysical and epistemological problem.
Russell's picture of how the application to Kant should go appears to have been something like this: The noumenal world, not being given to us in intuition, cannot, apparently, be required to have properties in common with the phenomenal world. This leaves us with the problem of understanding how to formulate any conception of what the noumenal world is like and of understanding how it can be knowable. But because structural similarity has a purely logical characterization, it is independent of intuition. The noumenal world thus emerges as an isomorphic copy of the phenomenal world, one which we may suppose has the requisite similarity with the world of phenomena without thereby committing ourselves to the idea that it shares any of the intuitive properties of the phenomenal world. Had it not proved possible to capture this notion of similarity by purely logical means, we would have been precluded from assuming even this degree of similarity between noumena and phenomena, and might, therefore, have been inclined toward some form of idealism regarding the world behind phenomena. The purely logical notion of structural similarity preserves us from this tendency toward idealism, since it shows how we might have knowledge about the relations that order the noumenal world, without needing to assume intuitive knowledge of those relations. 4 It is clear that the same thought underlies our earlier quote from Problems regarding shape and order: it is not necessary to suppose acquaintance with the relation that holds among the members of the regiment provided we can express the structure of that relation, as, indeed, the notion of order permits 376
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4 As noted in the text, structuralism is developed at length in The Analysis of Matter, but this application of the view was already announced in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy: 'There has been a great deal of speculation in traditional philosophy which might have been avoided if the importance of structure, and the difficulty of getting behind it, had been realized. For example, it is often said that space and time are subjective, but they have objective counterparts; or that phenomena are subjective, but are caused by things in themselves, which must have differences inter se corresponding with the differences in the phenomena to which they give rise. Where such hypotheses are made, it is generally supposed that we can know very little about the objective counterparts. In actual fact, however, if the hypotheses as stated were correct, the objective counterparts would form a world having the same structure as the phenomenal world, and allowing us to infer from phenomena the truth of all propositions that can be stated in abstract terms and are known to be true of phenomena. If the phenomenal world has three dimensions, so must the world behind phenomena; if the phenomenal world is Euclidean, so must the other be; and so on. In short, every proposition having a communicable significance must be true of both worlds or of neither: the only difference must lie in just that essence of individuality which always eludes words and baffles description, but which, for that very reason is irrelevant to science. Now the only purpose that philosophers have in view in condemning phenomena is in order to persuade themselves and others that the real world is very different from the world of appearance. We can all sympathize with their wish to prove such a very desirable proposition, but we cannot congratulate them on their success. It is true that many of them do not assert objective counterparts to phenomena, and these escape from the above argument. Those who do assert counterparts are, as a rule, very reticent on the subject, probably because they feel instinctively that, if pursued, it will bring about too much of a rapprochement between the real and the phenomenal world. If they were to pursue the topic, they could hardly avoid the conclusions which we have been suggesting. In such ways, as well as in many others, the notion of structure [. . .] is important' (Russell [1919] , pp. 61-2).
us to do. Similarly, we need to be able to express the structure of the relations that hold among events in the material world, and on this basis, one might hope to construct the whole 'spatio-temporal' framework appropriate to the world behind phenomena. By means of this framework we can proceed to describe all those material events with which we are not acquainted, but regarding which we wish to assert many propositions. But to achieve this we need not be acquainted with the relations that generate this framework. This is an elegant application of a technical idea of mathematical logic to a philosophical problem. It is, however, subject to an important limitation. If we intend the statement that the noumenal world is isomorphic to the phenomenal one to be more than part of its definition-if, that is, we also intend it to be a significant claim that the noumenal and phenomenal worlds are structurally similar-then we are implicitly assuming that we have access to the relations holding among things in themselves independently of the correspondence in terms of which their similarity to phenomenal relations has been characterized. Otherwise, the observation that structural similarity allows us to preserve the comparability of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds is based on a mere stipulation, the character of the noumenal world having been defined in terms of the isomorphism. Since it owes nothing to intuition, structural similarity may be used to address the objection that there is literally nothing that can be said regarding things in themselves. But on the conception of the noumenal world to which we are led, it must be borne in mind that its similarity to the phenomenal world is the consequence of a definition.
The nature of a claim of structural similarity is such that it is a significant claim only when the relations being compared are given independently of the mapping which establishes their similarity. For this we require more than an appropriately general notion of similarity; we must, in addition, have independent knowledge of the relations between which the similarity is supposed to hold. Knowledge of the relations among things in themselves cannot be purely structural; they cannot merely be known as the images, under a suitable mapping, of the relations among phenomena, since that would make the claim of their similarity to relations among phenomena a tautology. But, things in themselves being 'in themselves', neither can it be intuitive. The noumenal world would seem, therefore, to have retained almost all of its elusive character. Mutatis mutandis, the relations among events of the physical world cannot be defined as the isomorphic image of the relations holding among those events with which we are acquainted if we intend to preserve the non-triviality of the thesis that the two systems of relations are similar. As we will see, this difficulty is pervasive, and is one that re-emerges in a sharper form in the context of later developments.
Finally, let us note by way of conclusion that Russell's use of the distinction between acquaintance and description rests on the assumption that although knowledge by acquaintance is not required for us to have knowledge about some entity or other, knowledge of a propositional function uniquely satisfied by that entity suffices to ensure reference to it. This assumption is questionable if we think of knowledge of reference as something that carries with it knowledge of what (or of whom, etc.) we are referring to. In fact, Russell does not think that such knowledge is required for reference to be successful. Instead, he endorses the view that having such knowledge-'knowledge-wh', as I shall call it-requires knowledge by acquaintance. But acquaintance seems to be far too strong a requirement for knowledge-wh, if the pre-analytic connection between knowledge-wh and knowledge of reference is to be preserved. It would thus seem that knowledge-wh is a type of knowledge that is not captured by the acquaintance/description division: I know that the next president of the United States will be the person who gets the most Electoral College votes, and I know that x gets the most Electoral College votes in the US election of 2000 is a propositional function that, when satisfied, is uniquely satisfied, but it is at least questionable whether, knowing these things and using this expression, I succeed in referring to anyone.
5 And while I am not acquainted with George W. Bush, it is plausible to suppose that I know who he is, and thus satisfy one condition for sometimes successfully referring to him. In short, knowledge by description appears to be too 'thin', and knowledge by acquaintance too 'thick', to tell us what knowledge of reference consists in. Perhaps Russell thought that further restricting the propositional constituents with which we refer to things outside our acquaintance to constituents with which we are acquainted overcomes-rather than compounds-the difficulty with this use of knowledge by description. If so, he was mistaken and the extent of his mistake will become apparent from our discussion of the extension of his ideas to the theory of theories. of existentially quantifying on the theoretical terms and replacing them by variables X 1 , . . . , X n of the appropriate arity and type (or sort, if the underlying logic of R(y) is taken to be first-order). The replacement of y by R(y) preserves the class of derivable consequences involving the observational vocabulary, what Ramsey called 'the system of primary propositions' of y; it is in this sense that, for Ramsey, R(y) can be said to capture the content of y.
6
But of course R(y) must necessarily diverge from y in those consequences involving the theoretical vocabulary (Ramsey's so-called 'secondary propositions' or 'secondary system'). Now the point of Ramsey's proposal is to address the role of theoretical terms only in the deductive structure of y, and then to address their role only in that part of its deductive structure that is relevant to the derivation of the primary propositions. Ramsey in effect observed that if y contains sufficiently explicit deductions of its primary propositions, then these deductions have a representation in R(y). But since in R(y) the 'propositions' which are the transforms of secondary propositions contain variables wherever the original propositions contained theoretical terms, their meaning is exhausted by the contribution of the observational vocabulary they contain. As Ramsey ([1929] , p. 232) put it, We can say, therefore, that the incompleteness of the 'propositions' of the secondary system [more exactly, the incompleteness of their transforms in R(y) that results from the replacement of constants by variables] affects our disputes but not our reasoning.
And since, for Ramsey, it is only our reasoning that we need to reconstruct, this incompleteness is irrelevant. The idea of a Ramsey sentence depends on nothing more contentious than this elementary observation about the formal character of logical derivation. But of course to grant this is not to concede On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoretical Knowledge 379 the correctness of the view of 'secondary propositions'-as mere auxiliaries in the derivation of primary propositions-which it advances. Regarding Ramsey's remark about disputes vs reasoning, it is obvious that if two theories T 1 and T 2 conflict in their secondary propositions, this conflict need not be preserved under 'Ramsification' but might well be 'existentially generalized away'. It is however possible to take things a step further by recalling an observation of English ([1973] ): it is a consequence of the Craig Interpolation Theorem that if two first-order theories with disjoint T-vocabularies but coincident O-vocabularies are inconsistent with one another, then there is a sentence s in their common O-vocabulary which 'separates' them, i.e. which is such that T 1 implies s while T 2 implies :s. Hence T 1 and T 2 cannot be compatible with the same 'data'. The proof is straightforward: If T 1 [ T 2 is inconsistent, then by the Compactness Theorem there are finite subsets S i T i (i¼1, 2) such that S 1 [ S 2 is inconsistent. Let s i be the conjunction of the sentences in S i . Then s 1 implies :s 2 . By Craig Interpolation, there is a sentence s such that s 1 implies s, and s implies :s 2 , where s is in the common vocabulary of s 1 and s 2 , i.e., s is an O-sentence formulated in the common observational vocabulary of T 1 and T 2 . But then T 1 and T 2 cannot both be compatible with all observations: if s holds, then T 2 is false, and if it does not hold, T 1 is false. 7 We can turn this observation about first-order theories into one about Ramsey sentences: there cannot be two incompatible Ramsey sentences both of which are compatible with all the true O-sentences. Provided our original theories are first-order, it doesn't matter for the application of first-order model theory that their Ramsey sentences are second-order. The essential idea behind the use of the Ramsey sentence, as we have noted, is that only the logical category of the theoretical terms is relevant to their role in deducing the primary propositions. So long as the replacement preserves the logical category of the original vocabulary items, someone who holds that the Ramsey sentence of a theory captures its 'content' can have no objection to a uniform replacement of the theoretical vocabularies of T 1 and T 2 with new non-logical constants, making their theoretical vocabularies disjoint, and therefore ensuring that T 1 and T 2 satisfy the hypothesis of our corollary to Craig Interpolation. The identification of a theory with its Ramsey sentence therefore comes at a price: the notion that two theories might be compatible with the same data and yet conflict with one another must be given up, so that when theories are identified with their Ramsey sentences, a conflict in some secondary proposition must be reflected in a primary proposition.
The general methodological issues addressed by the notion of a Ramsey sentence do not exhaust Ramsey's interest in the elimination of 'superfluous elements'. A fragment found with 'Theories' shows Ramsey to have had an interest in particular cases that is worth noting. It is unfortunate that this fragment has not been reprinted in any of the published editions of Ramsey's papers since it shows Ramsey to have perceived with remarkable clarity the foundational problem of characterizing Newtonian space-time. 8 The text is worth quoting in full:
In a completely satisfactory theory I think we should (a) have a complete dictionary. (b) have no superfluous elements.
(b) cannot be exactly defined: it means that we cannot get a simpler equivalent theory. But we may be able to do so by a little transformation when we cannot by simply leaving out a part as it stands. Weyl's requirements ([1922] , p. 87) are Einstimmigkeit [unanimity] and no u¨berflu¨ssen gestandteile [superfluity of expression]. Which seem to mean that every theoretical quantity can in principle be evaluated and that all ways of evaluating it lead to the same result. In principle must here mean merely that certain possible courses of experiences would determine its value.
If not, of course, there is something superfluoush. E.ig. our velocity in absolute space could not be determined, and so some truthpossibilities of theoretical functions give hani equivalent theory. hThereforei some economy ought to be possible, but it is not clear how without a good deal of thought. That makes indeed a good exercise.
What is the proper form of Newtonian Mechanics? Which gives absolute acceleration a meaningh,i absolute velocityh,i none. It must be a sort of geometry containing straight lines and a fixed direction. One must give an axiomatic description of such a geometry. 9
The problem Ramsey has posed-the formulation of a 4-dimensional affine geometry for Newtonian Mechanics-differs from the general methodological issue addressed by the Ramsey sentence in a crucial respect. The transformation of Newtonian Mechanics to R (Newtonian Mechanics) takes for granted the theoretical formulation of its secondary system of propositions, but the idea underlying a reformulation of Newtonian Mechanics without absolute space is that it leads to a refinement of its theoretical commitments by eliminating certain putative primary propositions, namely all those reporting a
On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoretical Knowledge 381 measurement of absolute velocity. By contrast, when we 'Ramsify' we assume that the primary propositions have been correctly circumscribed, since there is nothing in the transformation to the Ramsey sentence capable of correcting matters if this has not been done. But this is just to say that Ramsey's distinction between primary and secondary propositions really doesn't address the kind of 'superfluity' that attaches to absolute space and absolute velocity in Newtonian Mechanics, since the source of their superfluousness is the dynamical structure of the theory: in a theory with a different dynamical structure, absolute space and absolute velocity would not be superfluous, and the propositions reporting their state would properly occur in such a theory and would occur among the theory's primary propositions. In addition to whatever other criteria they fulfill, for Ramsey the primary propositions of a properly formulated theory satisfy Russell's fundamental principle-indeed, Ramsey even goes so far as to say (Ramsey [1929] , p. 213) that names of experiences are descriptions unless the experiences named are present experiences. The epistemic significance of names vs variables is therefore much the same for Ramsey as it is for Russell: names require an account of how they are understood; variables do not. Certainly, Ramsey supposes that our understanding of the vocabulary of the primary propositions (the observation or O-vocabulary) is unproblematic. And since only the O-vocabulary is regarded as unproblematic, Ramsey's account is naturally viewed as an extension to the case of theoretical predicates of Russell's analysis of the meaning of names for things falling outside our acquaintance. By eliminating theoretical predicates and replacing them with variables, Ramsey avoids any difficulty their presence might pose for an empiricist theory of propositional understanding.
Ramsey assumes that the referents of the theoretical predicates are not known by acquaintance and that therefore the theoretical predicates are not understood in accordance with the fundamental principle, but he refrains from offering a positive account of the character of our knowledge of theoretical relations along the lines of Russell's structuralism. Ramsey ignores this question and focuses on another: significantly diverging from Russell, Ramsey turns his attention to the collection of propositions which constitute the theory and then considers the effect of identifying the content of the secondary propositions with their consequences in the primary system. 10 The implicit assumption, that only the vocabulary of the primary system is fully contentful, and that our understanding of the secondary propositions consists in our understanding of logic plus the vocabulary belonging to the primary system, is in essence Russell's view. What is novel is the manner in which Ramsey bypasses the issue of the meaning of the individual terms of the theoretical vocabulary by eliminating them in favor of variables, since the technical device by which this is achieved leads to the idea (found later, as we will see, in Carnap) of expressing the content of the theory as a whole by the set of its primary propositions.
11
Before proceeding to later developments, let me briefly summarize the salient points of comparison between Ramsey and Russell. First, Ramsey is prepared to preserve the idea that the theoretical or 'T-vocabulary' is referential, without, however, necessarily preserving the 'order' (in the sense of the ramified hierarchy) of the relations, since the systematic substitution of 9-bound variables for T-vocabulary items requires only that the matrix y(O 1 , . . . , O m ; X 1 , . . . , X n ) be satisfied by entities of the appropriate simple type. This I take it is the significance of Ramsey's remark ([1929] , p. 231) that 'it is evident that [the values of the bound variables] are to be taken purely extensionally. Their extensions may be filled with intensions or not, but this is irrelevant to what can be deduced in the primary system.' Secondly, Ramsey does not claim to be giving explicit or implicit definitions (the concept of implicit definition is not discussed by Ramsey) of the vocabulary of the secondary system. The paper canvasses various possible general strategies for explicitly defining the secondary vocabulary in terms of the primary vocabulary but concludes that this is unlikely since the 'secondary system has a higher multiplicity, i.e. more degrees of freedom than the primary [. . .] and such an increase of multiplicity is [. . .] [likely] a universal characteristic of useful theories' (Ramsey [1929] , p. 222). Correlative to this last point, by not offering explicit definitions, Ramsey's approach echoes Russell's contextual definition of problematic names. But there is no question of contextually analyzing the T-terms away in Russell's sense, since R(y) is only 'weakly' equivalent to y-equivalent over the sentences taken from the primary system. By contrast, for Russell, the transform [S(n)]
T of a sentence effected by the description theory of names is supposed to be equivalent to the original sentence S(n). Finally, notice that our comparison of Ramsey and Russell is based entirely on Russell's application of his extension of his theory of descriptions to names of things falling outside our acquaintance-on aspects of the theory of propositional understanding which emerged from his theory of descriptions and description theory of names-and has not at any point appealed to Ramsey's view regarding the nature of our knowledge of
On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoretical Knowledge 383 matter and the theoretical relations of physics, beyond the minimalist claim that such knowledge as we have is not knowledge by acquaintance. It might seem therefore that Ramsey's development of the theory of propositional understanding is viable in a way that Russell's elaboration of it in terms of his structuralism was seen not to be. In the next section, we will see that this is not the case, even under a refinement of the theory introduced by Carnap.
4 Carnap's reconstruction of the language of science and an observation of Newman
The next major development in the tradition I have been reviewing is Carnap's mature reconstruction of the 'language of science', first presented in his Santa Barbara Lecture of 1959 12 and subsequently developed in ([1963] ).
Carnap's primary goal was to provide a reconstruction which clearly separated the factual from the non-factual assumptions of a physical theory. Carnap frequently emphasized 13 that virtually every unreconstructed sentence of the language of science and everyday life has both factual and non-factual aspects, so that the sharp separation of our language into factual and nonfactual sentences is meaningful only relative to a reconstruction of that language. His proposed reconstruction is very simple. Like Ramsey, he focussed on the factual content of a theory as a whole. And like Ramsey, he took this to be carried by its Ramsey sentence. For Carnap, as for Ramsey, the decisive consideration that justifies locating the factual content of y in R(y) is that R(y) has the same Oconsequences as y. Carnap, however, seeks to effect a general procedure for isolating the stipulational or non-factual component of y to a proper part of the theoretical reconstruction, with the factual content of the theory being exhausted by its Ramsey sentence. On Carnap's reconstruction, the nonfactual or analytic component is given by what has come to be called the 'Carnap sentence', C(y) (¼R(y) ! y), of the theory, a sentence which expresses the thought that if anything satisfies the matrix of the Ramsey sentence of the theory, then the referents of the terms of the unreconstructed theory do. Carnap argues that since C(y) has the property that R(C(y)) is L-true, and therefore has no O-consequences except those that are L-true, it is appropriately non-factual.
There are a number of simple connections between y, R(y) and C(y) which we should record. y is obviously equivalent to the conjunction of C(y) and R(y). Under the assumption that the Ramsey sentence R(y) of y is true, y , RðyÞ ! y i.e., under the 'factual' hypothesis that something satisfies y, y is equivalent to its Carnap sentence. More significantly, 14 under the analytically true (for Carnap, 'non-factual') assumption of the Carnap sentence, it follows that y , RðyÞ i.e., it follows that y is equivalent to its Ramsey sentence-not just equivalent over the primary system, to use Ramsey's terminology, but equivalent. But since the Carnap sentence is an analytic and hence necessary truth, we may simply say that y is equivalent to its Ramsey sentence without qualification. Intuitively, by accepting the Carnap sentence as analytic-by stipulating that C(y) holds-we exclude as conceptually possible all those models in which the Carnap sentence fails; a model in which R(y) holds but y fails is simply not a possible model. As simple and elegant as Carnap's proposed reconstruction is, I think it cannot be accepted as an accurate reflection of our preanalytic understanding of our theoretical knowledge about the physical world. That the attempt to do so leads to evidently unacceptable consequences is, I think, the lesson to be drawn from an old observation of Newman ([1928] ), an observation that lies at the basis of the formulation of the earliest and simplest of Hilary Putnam's 'model-theoretic arguments'. 15 The application of Newman's observation which I will be developing-by contrast with Putnam's deployment of his argument against 'metaphysical realism'-is completely straightforward. The presentation differs from Newman's only in the use of model-theoretic terminology; conceptually, the point is entirely the same. Suppose we are given a theory y, all of whose observational consequences are true; it follows from this supposition that y is empirically adequate and consistent. Suppose also that the observational consequences of y can be characterized as a subset of the sentences generated from a given O-vocabulary. Suppose further that the interpretation of the language L(y) of y is specified only for its O-vocabulary, and that the interpretation of the T-vocabulary is fixed only up to the logical type and arity of the T-terms; L(y) is said to be 'partially interpreted'. Notice that partial interpretation is the reflection in the theory of theories of what, in our discussion of Russell's theory of our knowledge of matter, we identified as his tacit assumption (iv): the logically primitive predicate expressions we are entitled to suppose we understand are restricted in their extension to objects of possible acquaintance. Without this assumption, the empiricist motivation for distinguishing between the O-and T-vocabularies-and, therefore, Ramsey's primary and secondary systems-would be lost. 16 Notice also that it is no objection to the distinction to observe that it cannot be satisfactorily drawn within the unreconstructed vocabulary of the language of science. The point of the reconstruction of theories we are exploring is to show that it is possible to achieve the theoretical knowledge we take ourselves to have by showing how-within a reconstruction in which the distinction between the observational and the theoretical does its intended work-we can give a faithful representation of what we take ourselves to know. Provided we can isolate the observable part of any intended model of y, it is always possible to introduce into the reconstructed language of y properly observational predicates, predicates defined in terms of the restrictions of the interpretation of the predicates of the unreconstructed vocabulary to the subset of observable elements of the domain. (Indeed, as we will see later, this possibility establishes a connecting link between Carnap-Ramsey and 'constructive empiricism'.) It is clear from the foregoing that for Carnap y is effectively identified with the matrix of its Ramsey sentence and that this is entirely in keeping with his view, for Carnap says of the Ramsey sentence of y, that while it does indeed refer to theoretical entities by the use of abstract variables, [. . .] it should be noted that these entities are [. . .] purely logicomathematical entities, e.g. natural numbers, classes of such, classes of classes, etc. Nevertheless, R(y) is obviously a factual sentence. It says that the observable events in the world are such that there are numbers, classes of such, etc. which are correlated with the events in a prescribed way and which have among themselves certain relations; and this assertion is clearly a factual statement about the world. ([1963], p. 963) That is to say, Carnap shares with Ramsey the idea that the 'factual content' of the theory consists in its consequences in the language of the primary 16 The well-known paper of Lewis ([1970] ) is often represented as a part of the Carnap-Ramsey program we have been reviewing. This assimilation is a mistake. Aside from Lewis's adoption of the formal apparatus of the Ramsey and Carnap sentences, both his positive contribution and the philosophical concerns he address are orthogonal to Carnap-Ramsey. Lewis is himself explicit on the central point, namely that his O-vocabulary is not restricted in the way it must be for the Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction to have the epistemological interest claimed for it. A close study of Lewis's paper will show that its contribution is wholly logical: Lewis assumes that the theories to which his analysis applies are such that their O-terms implicitly define the T-terms in the sense that every automorphism of a model for the language of the theory that preserves the relations denoted by the O-terms will also preserve the relations denoted by the T-terms. Lewis's principal contribution consists in embedding this assumption and the formal features of the account of Ramsey and Carnap into a framework whose underlying logic allows for the possibility of denotationless terms. While this is not without an interest of its own, it lacks the philosophical motivation that prompts the Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction.
(Thanks to Philip Percival for asking about the relevance of Lewis's paper.) system; the theoretical claims taken by themselves are 'purely logicomathematical' in character. It has been objected 17 that passing to the Ramsey sentence of a theory that is advanced as merely an idealization, such as the theory of ideal gases, we lose the intuitive content of the original theory, since the Ramsey sentence represents it as advancing the false claim that, for example, there is an ideal gas, contrary to our pre-analytic understanding of the theory of ideal gases. However, as our quote from Carnap shows, the understanding of the distinction between theories involving idealization and theories not involving idealization on which this pre-analytic intuition depends is precisely what his use of the Ramsey sentence rejects. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that for Carnap all that needs to be preserved is reference to entities of the appropriate logical category, and it is a matter of indifference whether these entities are 'concrete' or 'ideal' (abstract). Although the case of idealization points to a difficulty in the equation of the factual content of a theory with the content of its Ramsey sentence, the difficulty goes much deeper than the failure of this equation to capture our pre-analytic understanding of theories of ideal systems. This is what we will now show. Since y is consistent, there is an 'abstract' model M of the T-sentences of y, although nothing of philosophical interest would be lost if we were forced to proceed directly from the assumption that y has such an 'abstract' model and were unable to infer this (e.g. because of the higher-order character of the language in which y is formulated) from the mere consistency of y. Without any significant loss of generality or philosophical interest, we may choose an M that is a model of the same cardinality as y's intended domain. Let W denote not the domain of the abstract model M, but the domain we take y to make assertions about-the 'intended domain' of y. By hypothesis, W has the same cardinality as M. It is therefore possible to extend the partial interpretation to the theoretical vocabulary of y by letting each predicate of its theoretical vocabulary denote the image in W of its interpretation in M under any one-one correspondence between M and W. For example, suppose T is a binary theoretical relation of y. Then the interpretation T W of T in W is defined as the image under j, j one-one from M on to W, of its interpretation T M in M. Since by construction ha, bi is in T M if and only if hja, jbi is in T W , j is an isomorphism; and therefore, if M is a model of y, so is W.
Call the interpretation of y's T-vocabulary in W that we have just described '='. Any theory of knowledge and reference that is incapable of distinguishing truth from truth under = is committed to the implication that y is true if y is true under =. But modulo our assumption about cardinality, that y is true under = is a matter of model theory. = is arbitrary; the construction which employs it is clearly unacceptable, since it trivializes the question whether y is true. Any account of our theoretical knowledge that cannot exclude = as an interpretation of the language which adequately captures the interpretation under which we suppose that y is true, cannot account for our naive confidence in the belief that our theories, if true, contain significant theoretical truths about the world. By equating truth with truth under = we rob our knowledge of the truth of our theoretical claims of its a posteriori character: modulo a single assumption about cardinality, the theoretical statements of an empirically adequate theory come out true as a matter of metalogic. But we take the truth of y over its intended domain to be a significant truth, not one that is ensured by what is virtually a purely logical argument. Since there is nothing in Carnap's reconstruction to exclude the identification of truth with truth under =, an essential feature of the truth of our theories has been lost, and Ramsey's and Carnap's reconstructions cannot therefore be judged successful.
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The conclusion we have just reached was partly anticipated by John Winnie ([1967] ). 19 Winnie's emphasis is, however, different from ours, since for him the salient point is that if we are given a 'physical' interpretation under which y comes out true, it is virtually always possible to find another, as it happens abstract, arithmetical and unintended, interpretation that also makes y true. The problem Winnie emphasizes is therefore one of finding conditions that will exclude such unintended interpretations without compromising the assumptions of the framework within which the reconstruction is expressed. However, this way of presenting the difficulty is misleading. The Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction is unacceptable because it implies that the existence of an abstract model for y suffices for its truth over y's intended domain. What the reconstruction misses is a preanalytic intuition 18 Notice that the observation on which the 'model-theoretic argument' depends is quite elementary. In particular, the argument does not appeal to any major metalogical result, let alone anything so sophisticated as the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorem. One can formulate things so that the argument appears to require the model-existence lemma, but this is misleading since the semantic consistency of y would certainly be taken for granted by Carnap-Ramsey and therefore hardly needs to be derived. Notice also that, as presented here, the argument is not a permutation argument; such arguments are used by Putnam in other contexts (see note 19 below), but they are not essential to our concerns here. 19 The existence of an arithmetical model is the content of Winnie's second theorem and the main focus of his paper. His first theorem shows that, modulo a trivial restriction (noted below), if W is a model of y, so is W*, where W* is like W except for the interpretation of some T-predicate. Winnie's discussion assumes that the domain of any model of y is the disjoint union of subdomains W U and W O of (respectively) unobservable and observable entities, with the interpretation of the T-predicates restricted to W U . The trivial restriction is that if a T-predicate T is monadic, there is a u in W U such that u is not in the interpretation T W of T, and if T is nadic, there is a u in W U such that u is not a component of some n-tuple in T W . Putnam ([1981] , p. 217) appeals to a permutation argument of this sort without, however, correctly identifying the conditions under which the argument is valid. For a counterexample to Putnam's claim, see Keenan ([2000] ), Section 1. that governs our conception of truth, and this is missed even when we set aside any difficulty in fixing y's intended domain.
Extension of the foregoing to constructive empiricism
There is a common misperception of the point of Newman's observation, one for which Putnam is largely responsible. The misperception is that the interest of the preceding 'model-theoretic argument' must stand or fall according to how successfully it refutes 'metaphysical realism'. Perhaps there is an interesting position of this character which the argument refutes. But to show this we would have to engage in a rather involved investigation into the nature of realism, and should we fail to find a plausible version of metaphysical realism to serve as a suitable target for the argument, we might be led to suppose that the observation on which it is based fails to show anything of philosophical interest. 20 Nothing could be further from the truth.
In addition to its relevance to the Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction just reviewed, there is an 'epistemology of science' to which Newman's observation applies virtually directly. Bas van Fraassen's 'constructive empiricism' is essentially characterized by a central tenet and a pair of definitions. The central tenet is that it is always more rational to accept a theory as empirically adequate than to believe it true. The definitions are: (i) that to accept a theory as empirically adequate is to hold that 'the phenomena' form a substructure of a model belonging to the class of models that is the theory; and (ii) to believe a theory true is to hold that it contains the world among its models. 21 What distinguishes constructive empiricism from its less circumspect and non-empiricist opposition is its agnosticism regarding truth and the fact that the distinction between what is and is not observable is not drawn on the basis of vocabulary, but concerns the demarcation of substructures of the models which comprise the theory. Constructive empiricism does not deny that theories-i.e., the models theories comprise-contain unobservables in their intended domains; it is merely agnostic regarding a theory's claims about them. What it holds in common with Carnap-Ramsey-when formulations are transposed to the framework preferred by the semantic view of theoriesis the notion that to assert a theory as true is to say that there is a model belonging to the theory (recall that for van Fraassen a theory is identified with a class of models) that 'corresponds' to the world:
My view is that physical theories do indeed describe much more than what is observable, but that what matters is empirical adequacy, and not the truth or falsity of how they go beyond observable phenomena [. . .] .
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and secondly, to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena. The structures which can be described in experimental and measurement reports we can call appearances; the theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model. (van Fraassen [1980], p. 64) But so long as a theory consists of empirically adequate models with domains of the right cardinality, constructive empiricism is committed to the view that a theory is true provided that it is empirically adequate. The issue is not constructive empiricism vs realism but whether the framework within which constructive empiricism is expressed-the semantic view of theoriessuccessfully recovers the intuitive sense which we attach to ascriptions of truth to our theoretical claims. Constructive empiricism supposes that it has captured this sense, and proceeds to oppose the belief that our theories are true. The difficulty is that, on its own account of the truth of theoretical claims that go beyond the phenomena, there is virtually nothing to choose between truth and empirical adequacy. This is contrary to the idea-evident to preanalytic intuition and, apparently, to constructive empiricists-that it is a substantial philosophical commitment to believe a theory true rather than to accept it as merely empirically adequate. What is in dispute is not whether we should believe our theories true-although this is of course an important issue-but whether constructive empiricists have captured what such a belief consists in, since, using our earlier construction, we can always ensure that any theory that saves the phenomena contains the world among the models it comprises: By hypothesis, one of the theory's empirically adequate and partially abstract models is in one-one correspondence with the world or 'intended domain' of observable and unobservable entities. In exact analogy with our argument against Carnap-Ramsey, define the theoretical relations on this intended domain so that, for example, T W holds of ha, bi if and only if
bi belongs to T M , where j is one-one from M on to W and is the identity map on M\W-the observable part of M and of W. This transforms a theory that merely saves the phenomena into a true one, since it ensures that the world is a member of the class of models that is the theory. But then what has happened to the central tenet of constructive empiricism, according to which it is always more rational to accept a theory as empirically adequate than it is to believe it to be true? This appears to be based on nothing more than an agnosticism regarding the cardinality of the intended domain. Our deployment of Newman's observation thus shows that the combination 'constructive empiricism + semantic view of theories' yields an inherently unstable position. ([1989] , Ch. viii Section 6, and Ch. ix Section 3) has called the 'syntactic' view of theories, in contrast to van Fraassen's own 'semantic' view of theories. Recall that on the semantic view, we explicitly assume that y , y is true , y has a class of intended models so that on this view the truth of y is always understood relative to an 'intended' model. Indeed, on the semantic view a theory is identified with a class of intended models, and the truth of a theory consists in the world being one among the class of intended models which is the theory. Perhaps the restriction to intended models, on which the semantic view insists, makes it not vulnerable to the difficulties to which Carnap's syntactic account is subject.
There are however two senses of 'intended model' (or 'intended interpretation') at play here. The first sense is related to the distinction between what is sometimes called 'real' second order logic and the logical systems considered by Leon Henkin in his proofs of completeness. Such systems allow for general or Henkin models and this leads to a distinction between theories which hinges on the scope of the domain of the property and relation variables of a theory. This is the sense of 'intended model' that proponents of the semantic view emphasize when expounding their position, since unless a theory is identified with a class of intended models in this sense-thus invoking in an essential way a notion of theory that is not purely formal (but is what is sometimes called 'semi-formal')-the semantic approach's distinctive emphasis on mathematical as opposed to metamathematical methodology cannot be sustained. The semantic approach correctly observes that the use of axiomatics in foundational studies in the exact sciences is rather different from its use in metalogical investigations. Roughly speaking, in the former case we are concerned to characterize some property or other-say, the property of being a Euclidean space-and we proceed to do so by capturing ('up to isomorphism') a class of structures which exhibit the desired property. In the latter case, our interest in axiomatization is motivated by an altogether different set of considerations, such as, for example, our interest in the recursive enumerability of a particular set of truths.
Interesting as this methodological observation is, the sense of 'intended model' that needs to be addressed in order to avoid Putnam' s argument is what is involved when, in describing the meaning of some fragment of our language, we distinguish one interpretation of the non-logical constants of this fragment as the intended one. This problem is at best only partially addressed by the issues peculiar to the interpretation of the variables of the underlying logic; while this fixes the domain from which the properties and relations are drawn, it leaves unsettled which relations on the domain are the subject-matter of the theory. Putnam's observation, that we can't take the intended model in this second sense to be singled out by R(y), also applies to the semantic view's identification of a theory with a class of intended models, since this identification concerns only the first sense of 'intended model'. To address the second sense of 'intended model', involving as it does the constant terms, would be to engage in an analysis of the meaning of the language of y, contrary to the promise of the semantic view that it allows us to dispense with such questions altogether. Invoking the semantic view appears therefore to have brought us no closer to a satisfactory account of our theoretical knowledge.
In a recent paper, van Fraassen ([1997] ) addresses Putnam's modeltheoretic argument at some length, without, however, explicitly observing its bearing on the formulation of the constructive empiricist theory of theories. The core of his analysis is that Putnam has exposed a new 'pragmatic paradox', a paradox that emerges when we question the interpretation of our own language. Van Fraassen's idea is that while we can coherently ask of a language we do not understand whether a predicate of that language refers to (say) green things, we cannot coherently ask of a language we do understand whether 'green' refers to green things, since it is implicit in the idea that 'green' is a predicate of our language that we know it to refer to green things. 22 The syntactic view of theories falls victim to Putnam's argument because it seeks to resolve the problem of fixing an interpretation of L(y) by purely formal means, something which the model-theoretic argument shows particularly clearly to be a mistake. By contrast, although the semantic view does not address the question of how the interpretation of L(y) is fixed, this is not a defect because the correctness of the intended interpretation is a presupposition to which the semantic view is entitled-it is a presupposition of the pragmatic background within which the models that are the theory are given and within which the semantic view is expressed. Here I think it is important to be clear on the kind of epistemological question Putnam's argument raises regarding the intended interpretation of L(y). We may distinguish a skeptical interpretation of the question 'How do we know that ''green'' refers to green things?' from an entirely different and non-skeptical interpretation of this question, one according to which we presume that we know that 'green' refers to green things and ask for the correct representation of our knowledge of this fact. 23 Clearly, under the latter interpretation, this is a question we can ask about any languageincluding languages we ourselves understand-without raising any hint of paradox, pragmatic or otherwise. Even if it is not legitimate to question whether the reference of one's language is correctly fixed in accordance with its customary interpretation, it is surely legitimate to ask how it is fixed. Carnap-Ramsey attempts to address this question by arguing for the adequacy of a reconstruction in which the theoretical vocabulary is eliminated; if such a reconstruction were successful, the question of how the reference of the theoretical vocabulary is fixed could be put to one side.
What is peculiar about the Carnap-Ramsey reconstruction is that it articulates its empiricist commitments by isolating the terms of the theoretical vocabulary as those for which an explanation of reference is especially pressing. Even if we believe that Carnap-Ramsey is insufficiently critical of its account of how the reference of the observational vocabulary is fixed, it is nevertheless intelligible that it should be puzzled by how the reference of the theoretical vocabulary might be fixed: the empiricist commitment it shares with Russell's theory of knowledge and propositional understanding yields a model for addressing the reference of the observational vocabulary that has no clear application to the theoretical case. The problem thus becomes one of explaining-or explaining away-the reference of the theoretical vocabulary; hence the Carnap-Ramsey strategy just reviewed. But the semantic view simply fails altogether to address the problem.
The problem clarified and resolved
To be significant, the claim that y's theoretical sentences are true must be understood relative to an interpretation of the language of y that is capable of being given independently of the truth of the theoretical sentences themselves. Preanalytically, we assume that the intended interpretation of the theoretical vocabulary is such an interpretation and that truth with respect to it is not something that can be settled by a purely logical argument. While the rational reconstructions we have been considering are perfectly adequate accounts of the deductive structure of our theories, they are unable to accommodate this feature of our ascriptions of truth. This is the central lesson of Newman's observation. In order to understand what has gone wrong and to better see both the nature of the problem we have uncovered and its solution, it is instructive to look at Russell's formulation of what he calls the problem of 'interpretation'.
The problem and its significance are explained in the Introduction to The Analysis of Matter, as follows:
It frequently happens that we have a deductive mathematical system, starting from hypotheses concerning undefined objects, and that we have reason to believe that there are objects fulfilling these hypotheses, although, initially, we are unable to point out any such objects with certainty. Usually, in such cases, although many different sets of objects are abstractly available as fulfilling the hypotheses, there is one such set which is much more important than the others. [. . .] The substitution of such a set for the undefined objects is 'interpretation.' This process is essential in discovering the philosophical import of physics. (Russell [1927], pp. 4-5) For Russell, the point-instants of the theory of space-time pose a problem exactly similar to that posed by the numbers in Peano's axiomatization of arithmetic. Recall that so far as the Peano axioms are concerned, any o-sequence forms the basis of a suitable model of the axioms. But among o-sequences, there is one that is distinguished, namely the one which consists of 'the' cardinal numbers, since, as Russell says, this fulfills the requirement 'that our numbers should have a definite meaning, not merely that they should have certain formal properties. This definite meaning is defined by the logical theory of arithmetic' (Russell [1919] , p. 10). The 'logical theory of arithmetic' associates '0' with the class of all null classes, '1' with the class of all singletons, '2' with the class of all couples, etc. Although any association with the members of a progression will succeed in giving a 'definite meaning' to the numeral names, Russell, like Frege before him, argued that among the various possible definite meanings, the one indicated is distinguished by the fact that it captures our use of the numeral names in our judgements of cardinality. The Frege-Russell cardinals are perhaps the simplest example of a successful application of the method of logical construction to a problem of 'interpretation' in Russell's sense. We would today express this by saying that the set-theoretic construction consisting of the Frege-Russell cardinals forms the basis of a representation of any model of the Peano axioms. The abstractness of the number-theoretic axioms consists in the fact that they fail to distinguish, among all possible osequences, the one which is associated with their foremost application. This is what the logical theory achieves.
The way to think of Russell's construction of point-instants is to see it as an attempt to accomplish for the theory of space-time what the definition of the Frege-Russell cardinals achieved for number theory. In each case, the axiomatically primitive notions of number and point-instant are to be replaced by something else-classes of equinumerous classes and maximal copunctual classes of events, respectively-in order to display the canonical applications of the theories in which these notions occur. 24 In the arithmetical case, as we have seen, the canonical application of the theory was the use of numbers as cardinal numbers. Under the influence of Eddington, 25 Russell took the canonical application of the theory of space-time to be its use in measurement, a view to which they were led by the fundamental role of length and time in the measurement of physical magnitudes. Since Russell's construction of point-instants in terms of events is compatible with the assumption that events comprise only finite volumes, the representation of point-instants by classes of events was motivated by the observation that although there is no bound on the precision we may achieve in any actual measurement, we are always restricted to finite quantities. There is, however, an important difference between the arithmetical and spatio-temporal cases, one which arises from the fact that they involve applications of theories of very different character. In the context of Russell's logicism, the central question the arithmetical case raises is: 'Given a domain of individuals of the right cardinality, can we recover the structure of the numbers as a theorem of Principia?' As George Boolos ([1994] ) observed, it is a remarkable and insufficiently appreciated fact that we can. The answer is not obvious since Russell is not assuming that the numbers occur among the elements of the domain of individuals but at a higher type. A preliminary On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoretical Knowledge 395 24 To fully understand the program of logical construction advanced in Russell ([1927] ), it is necessary to look in detail at the notion of copunctuality and the 'logical constructions' the book advances. A complete study would be a large undertaking, but the basic idea may perhaps be at least indicated. In ([1927] ), a class of events is said to be copunctual when every five-tuple or quintet of events in the class have a 'common overlap'. When a quintet of events have a common overlap, Russell says that the five events stand in the relation of copunctuality ([1927] , p. 299). The terminology is potentially confusing since the predicate 'x is copunctual' refers to a property of classes of events, while copunctuality is a five-place relation between events. The use of quintets rather than some other number of events arises for technical reasons having to do with the dimensionality of the space whose points (point-instants) are being characterized as logical constructions-set-theoretic structures, as we would today say-out of events. Russell's point-instants are defined as maximal copunctual classes of events-maximal, that is, with respect to class inclusion. Assuming that there are copunctual classes of events, the success of the proof of the existence of space-time points, which occupies Chapter xxviii of ([1927] ), turns on showing that every such copunctual class can be extended to a maximally copunctual class. Russell's proof uses Well Ordering, applied to the domain of all events, and his theorem has an evident similarity to the Ultrafilter (or Maximal Dual Ideal) Theorem for Boolean Algebras, with the property of being a copunctual class playing a role analogous to that played by the 'finite intersection property' in the context of the representation theory of Boolean algebras. Indeed, the analogy can be developed further to illuminate the difference between Russell's construction and the earlier, but more restricted, construction by Whitehead in terms of 'enclosure series'. Whitehead's construction of spatial points consists in identifying a point with a class of nested volumes ('nested' by the relation of spatial inclusion). Transposed to the spatial case for comparison, Russell's construction requires only the existence of a common spatial overlap among the volumes belonging to the class of volumes which are the point. Russell's notion generalizes Whitehead's enclosure series in the same sense in which the notion of filter generalizes that of a nested sequence or chain. 25 Russell's understanding of General Relativity seems to have been largely derived from Eddington ([1924] ). This is not to say that Russell's reading of Eddington was uncritical; see, e.g., Russell ([1927] , pp. 90-2) for an assessment of Eddington's operationalism.
definition: Russell calls a class of individuals inductive if it belongs to every class which contains the null class of individuals and is closed under the addition of singletons (or, equivalently, if it is in one-one correspondence with the integers less than n for some integer n; this terminology is evidently motivated by the analogy with the principle of mathematical induction and the definition of the finite numbers). A class is non-inductive if it is not inductive. Whitehead and Russell's Axiom of Infinity states that the class of individuals or entities of Type 0 is non-inductive. On the basis of this assumption, it is possible to prove (Whitehead and Russell [1912] , *124.57)-without the Axiom of Choice, and therefore one might well argue, by employing only logical modes of reasoning-that the Frege-Russell cardinals, which are entities of Type 2 in the simple type hierarchy, are 'reflexive' or Dedekind-infinite, and thus form the domain of a model of the Peano axioms. Now for Russell, the analysis of matter just is the extension of the method of logical construction to physics in general, and to the theory of space-time in particular. Restricting our attention to the space-time case, here the successful execution of Russell's program and a satisfactory solution to his formulation of the problem of interpretation requires that every abstract model of the theory should have an isomorphic representation by one constructed in terms of maximal copunctual classes of events, where, in analogy with the use of the Axiom of Infinity in the number-theoretic case, events are presumed to comprise a countable collection of concrete individuals (for Russell, events are the 'ultimate constituents of the material world'). The program of construction requires, quite properly, and again in parallel with the number-theoretic case, that it be provable that the class of events gives rise to an isomorphic representation of any model of the theory of space-time. Thus formulated, the program of logical construction is a familiar part of the nature and methodology of representation theorems, a part which Russell understood perfectly well.
It is important not to mistake the successful execution of the program of logical construction with the vindication of the central epistemological contention of Russell's structuralism: from the fact that the representation of any model of space-time is purely structure-preserving, it might well seem to follow that the knowledge expressed by the original theory-in this case, the theory of space-time-is, in the sense appropriate to Russell's theory of knowledge, 'purely structural'. As Russell understands them, the analysis of matter and (more specifically) the problem of the interpretation of the theory of space-time, do not in any way require non-structural knowledge of spatiotemporal relations. This is not an oversight, but an essential feature of the notion of analysis in which Russell is engaged. Non-structural knowledge is not required because the task which the program of interpretation sets itself is the purely mathematical one of constructing an isomorphic representation of the space-time of one physical theory or another, a representation defined over point-instants, appropriately constructed as maximal copunctual classes of events of finite extent.
There are many obstacles to successfully deploying the method of interpretation or logical construction in aid of structuralism.
26 But the central difficulty arises from the fact that for Russell a successful interpretation of spatio-temporal concepts is not essentially different from the analysis and interpretation of arithmetical concepts with which Principia is occupied. Both projects proceed relative to a non-logical assumption regarding the nature and cardinality of the domain over which the construction is effected, and in both cases the problem is to show, by purely logical modes of reasoning if possible, that a particular mathematical structure-that of the natural number system or of space-time-can be represented by a logical construction. Such a notion of interpretation addresses one way of understanding the problem of the 'applicability' of a mathematical framework, one that is resolved for Russell once the fundamental objects of the framework are constructed-in the case of space-time, when point-instants are constructed from 'percepts', or more generally, from events of finite extent-and appropriate relations are defined over them. Suppose we allow Russell the assumptions he requires for his construction of point-instants to succeed, and grant that overlapping and copunctuality are relations which are both perceptible and hold among events which are not percepts. Then even leaving to one side the conflict this poses for his theory of knowledge-for the structure/quality division of what we are capable of knowing regarding the material world-there remains an important difficulty with Russell's notion of interpretation, a difficulty which attaches to the adequacy of his philosophy of physics and theory of theoretical knowledge. Russell's approach makes perfect sense when the theory of space-time is conceived as the a priori or 'quasi-a priori' background for spatio-temporal measurement. But from our post-Einsteinian perspective there is more to the theory of space-time than understanding its role in measurement. To accommodate this additional element, our analysis of the interpretation of spatio-temporal concepts must be capable of revealing the theory of space-time as an a posteriori theory of the spatio-temporal structure of the world. Russell's notion of interpretation as logical construction fails to address this task. And while it is certainly true that knowledge of space-time structure rests on an interpretive claim, the nature of this interpretive claim is not illuminated by Russell's notion of interpretation. To see this, notice that there are at least three notions of interpretation that are relevant to space-time theories, of which Russell might be understood to countenance only the first two.
(i) There is the official notion, the one to which Russell's structuralism entitles him. Interpretation in this sense seeks to construct the domain of objects over which the theory is normally interpreted as quantifying. This is what the construction of point-instants seeks to secure in the case of theories of spacetime. But not having access to the relations on this domain, providing an 'interpretation' reduces to the purely mathematical problem of finding some family of relations definable over the constructed objects which constitute the basis for a model of the theory. By its very nature, such an interpretation cannot succeed in illuminating the epistemic status of the theoretical claims of a theory, since there will always be some family of relations of the appropriate structure. This is in essence just Newman's observation.
(ii) There is a second sense of 'interpretation' that arises if we ignore the constraints of structuralism and allow that we have access to the relations of the theory in addition to having specified the domain of objects among which they hold. 27 The problem of interpretation then consists of two tasks: the purely logical one of showing the sufficiency of a set of postulates regarding the relations of the model-Do the postulates capture the basic truths of the original theory?-and the epistemological task of motivating the 'naturalness' of the properties the postulates impose. Although interpretation in this sense is not intrinsically incapable of illuminating the epistemic status of theoretical claims-indeed it is hardly different from articulating a well-motivated axiomatization of the theory-its success turns entirely on how it is elaborated in particular cases, on the persuasiveness and sufficiency of the individual axiomatization on offer.
(iii) But there is an altogether different notion of 'interpretation', one that neither of the previous notions captures. It arises when we expect interpretive claims to clarify the nature and epistemic status of our theoretical commitments in a sense that we can perhaps make clear by briefly reviewing the analysis that lies at the basis of our knowledge of the space-time structure of special relativity and its divergence from Newtonian space-time.
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Generally speaking, we wish to discover those criteria of application that our use of a theoretical predicate or relation-expression presupposes so that our assertions regarding the structure in which the associated relation occurs are seen to have the epistemic status that pre-analytically we suppose them to have. It is a presupposition of our successful reference to theoretical relations that we know what the relations are that our theoretical predicates refer to. Even if we take for granted our knowledge of what relation a particular predicate refers to, this falls short of assuming everything of interest that might be asked regarding our knowledge of the reference of the predicates of our language. We have seen that whatever such knowledge consists in, it is not recoverable within the simple empiricist model that Carnap and Ramsey inherited from Russell. The problem is not addressed by a psychological investigation into the origin of our ideas, but requires a conceptual analysis of our theoretical knowledge in general, and of our knowledge of physics in particular, one that clarifies and reveals those assumptions that are implicit in our basic judgements involving the theoretical vocabulary. Assuming that theoretical predicates do refer to their intended referents, we wish to indicate what criteria control the application of such predicates, and we wish to indicate what the conditions of adequacy for such criteria of application might be. The main desideratum for a successful analysis along these lines-and the successful account of our understanding of theoretical predicates which such an analysis would yield-is that it should imply that our theoretical claims, when true, are significant truths about the world. Neither the CarnapRamsey reconstruction nor the constructive empiricist alternative to it meets this condition.
The nature of the problem and the basic idea underlying our proposed solution can be made clear if we take as the predicate whose criterion of application needs to be uncovered the predicate 'x is simultaneous with y.' This predicate is fundamental to both the Newtonian and the Einsteinian cases, since even spatial measurements implicitly assume a comparison of distances at a time, and this requires that we should have settled on a criterion of application for simultaneity. Since simultaneity is an empirical relation among events, one which holds or fails to hold as a matter of fact, we must be able to specify a criterion in accordance with which we can say that pairs of events-including distant events-are or are not in the relation of simultaneity. To grant this is not to say that 'meaning is verification': it On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoretical Knowledge 399 must be part of any view of physics that a presupposition of our use of 'x is simultaneous with y,' both in our theorizing and in the evaluation of our theorizing about space-time, is that it requires an empirically-based criterion for applying spatial and temporal predicates. We wish to know those criteria of application that enable us to extend our ordinary judgements involving simultaneity to cases which they may not originally have been designed to cover; and we wish to know whether, in the process, the criteria of application that govern spatio-temporal predicates come to be subject to any new constraints. An 'interpretation' of a space-time theory seeks to address these tasks. Let us consider more specifically what the special relativistic analysis of simultaneity contributes to our understanding of these matters. Among the criteria of application we actually employ, it is clear that some implicitly assume a process of signaling-as, for example, when we count as simultaneous two distant events which are seen to coincide with some local event, such as the position of the hands of a clock. This is a criterion that is not only shared by the theoretical frameworks-special relativity and Newtonian Mechanics-we are discussing, but is also found among our common-sense criteria of application for simultaneity, given the assumption that the signaling criteria employed by our theories are merely refinements of what we deploy in pre-scientific contexts. But because it admits infinitely fast signals, the Newtonian theory allows for a velocity-independent criterion of application for 'x is simultaneous with y.' Within the Newtonian framework, this criterion has the further justification of being in an appropriate sense 'absolute', since, being independent of any finitely-transmitted signal, it is also independent of the relative velocity of the frame of reference, and is therefore formulable without reference to the peculiarities of the circumstances of its application.
There is, however, another criterion of application that is absolute in this same sense even though it is based on the use of finite signals and is therefore velocity-dependent. This is the criterion based on light-signaling that emerges from Maxwell's theory, since according to this theory, the velocity of light is the same for all 'observers'-all inertial frames. On Maxwell's theory, a signaling criterion which employs light signals is therefore as observerindependent-as absolute-a criterion of application for 'x is simultaneous with y' as is the Newtonian criterion. But unlike the Newtonian criterion, light signaling also supports our practical criteria of application for simultaneity, insofar as they are implicitly based on some sort of finite signaling procedure. It is therefore a criterion that is much closer to what we typically rely upon in our actual judgements regarding spatial and temporal relations; but when it is embedded in the context of Maxwell's theory, it has the added advantage of being as absolute a criterion of application-as independent of the frame of reference-as the Newtonian one.
What is shown by the analysis of simultaneity just sketched is that there is a suitably absolute criterion, that it is based on the common practice of signaling, that it conforms with our most successful theoretical understanding of light transmission, and that under these circumstances, it should be acceptable even from a Newtonian perspective. Contrary to a standard understanding of Einstein's methodology, the basis for this choice of criterion of application cannot, therefore, be regarded as founded on nothing more than a free decision. Our 'choice' is clearly very highly constrained and is a reflection of our pre-analytic practice; what is striking is that it is also a reflection of a methodology that is largely shared by both the Newtonian and the Maxwellian frameworks. But adopting the light signaling criterion implicit in Maxwell's theory has the unexpected consequence that the relation of simultaneity that it governs is 'relative'-it has the consequence, that is, that 'observers' in relative motion to one another will disagree on which events are simultaneous with each other. Most importantly, for our purposes, it has the consequence that, relative to this criterion of application, the spacetime which the relation of simultaneity generates is Minkowskian rather than Newtonian. And on this reconstruction, the truth of this structural claim is correctly represented as a significant a posteriori truth about the physical world. Philosophy Departments of Bristol, Queen's, Glasgow and USC, and the Logic and Philosophy of Science Department of Irvine for the opportunity to present my ideas to them, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support. This paper is dedicated to the memory of my friend Graham Solomon, who died on 1 November 2001.
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